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The abolition of the one year time limit on other clauses of 60(b) would
do much to improve the current Rules.48  Experience under the "reasonable
time" limitation in all clauses of 60(b) indicates that courts maintain a
scrupulous regard for the aims of finality. They carefully consider the hard-
ship that a modification of judgment might visit on other parties4" and
demand that a petitioner show good cause for having failed to take appropriate
action sooner.5° And they do not tolerate motions aimed at protracting
litigation needlesslyY1 Few situations requiring relief are normally before
courts more than one year from judgment.5 2 And even if the abolition of a
time limit were to encourage spurious litigation, judicial, discretion would
promptly squelch it. Since finality can be ensured without a time limit,
courts should not be forced to choose between circumvention or injustice.
48. Since the abolition of the one year time limit would indefinitely extend a plenary
power of the court to correct judgments, a differentiation of stated grounds for relief
would be unnecessary. Rule 60(b) might contain only a general directive on thc use of
this power, see Moore & Rogers, at 693. However, separate grounds might be retained
as a guide for judicial discretion, by using Rule 6(b) to extend the stated time limits
in present Rule 60(b), see First Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments etc.,
Note following Rule 6(b), or by removing the one year limit of the current Rule.
49. Thus relief has been denied where many persons have relied upon a judgment,
e.g., Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Adams, 58 F. Supp. 579, 582 (S.D. Idaho 1945); or
where many actions were taken on the strength of the judgment, e.g., Menashe v. Sutton,
90 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); or where a party would be unable to obtain his
witnesses for a new action, e.g., McCawley v. Fleisehman Transportation Co., 10 F.R.D.
624 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
50. E.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) ; M. Lowenstein & Sons v.
American Undervear Mfg. Co., 11 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Ledwith v. Storkan,
2 F.R.D. 539 (D. Neb. 1942).
51. The moving party must at least assert that he has a valid claim or defense to
the judgment, e.g., Fernow v. Gubser, 136 F. 2d 971 (10th Cir. 1943); Sebastiano v.
United States, 15 FED. RULES SERv. 60 b.29 Case 2 (N.D. Ohio 1951). And in the event
of newly discovered evidence, he must demonstrate that the new evidence is likely to
change the result of the challenged judgment. See cases cited note 19 supra.
52. It is unlikely that people will sit back and permit judgments to operate against
them for long periods of time without attempting to secure any available relief. This Is
especially true since a longer delay decreases the chance for relief. Other parties are apt
to rely on judgments in the interim, see note 49 supra; and a longer delay is undoubtedly
more difficult to justify, see note 50 supra.
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CAMPAIGN SPEECHES ON RADIO AND TV:
IMPARTIALITY VIA THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT*
SEcrio.N 315 of the Communications Act of 19341 attempts in two ways
to secure impartial treatment of candidates during political campaigns. First,
a licensee-radio or television-who allows a legally qualified candidate tor
public office 2 to use his station must afford equal opportunities 3 to all such
*Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 909 (1951).
1. 48 STAT. 1064-1105 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-5, 201-22, 301-29, 351-62,
401-16, 501-6, 601-9 (1946), 47 U.S.C. §§ 154, 326, 402 (Supp. 1951).
Section 315 reads: "If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal oppor-
tunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station,
and the Commission shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow
the use of its station by any such candidate." 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1946). An identical provision was contained in the Federal Radio Act of 1927, which
directly preceded the Communications Act. 44 STAT. 1170 (1927), 47 U.S.C. § 93 (1946).
2. The FCC has defined a "legally qualified candidate" as "any person who has publicly
announced that he is a candidate for nomination by a convention of a political party or for
nomination or election in a primary, special, or general election, municipal, county, state
or national, and who meets the qualifications prescribed by the applicable laws to luald the
office for which he is a candidate, so that he may be voted for by the electorate directly
or by means of delegates or electors, and who: (1) has qualified for a place on the ballot
or (2) is eligible under the applicable law to be voted for by sticker, by writing in his
name on the ballot, or other method, and (i) has been duly nominated by a political party
which is commonly known and regarded as such, or (ii) makes a substantial showing
that he is a bona fide candidate for nomination or office, as the case may be." 47 Com
FED. REGS. §§ 3.190 (a) (A'), 3.290(a) (FM), 3.690(a) (TV) (1949). On definitional
problems raised by the phrase, consult Peterson, Political Broadcasts, 9 JoUtn:AL OF THE:
FEDERAL Co-mmsJickT.oNs BAR AssocrkTio.n 20, 21-5 (1943). Criticism of the FCC
definition can be found in Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 4 Pirm & FiscHuE Ra %Do RE ;. 1,
15-6 (1948) (separate Opinion of Commissioner Jones). For a judicial reaction, see,
Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 163 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 876 (1947).
For a novel suggestion that b 315 is inapplicable to presidential and vice-pre-idential
candidates because only electors are selected under the Constitution, see Note, 11 Trn.
L. Q. 213 (1937).
3. The FCC has interpreted this to mean no discrimination as to charges, practices,
regulations, facilities, or services. 47 CoDE FEo. REs. §§3.190(c) (AM), 3.290(c) (Fit),
3.690(c) (TV) (1949). A statutory definition to replace this agency interpretation w~as
once proposed. S.1333, Section 15(g), 80TH CONG., IsT SEss. (1947). However, it %as
not adopted.
For Commission interpretation of the regulation, see Stephens Broadcasting Co.,
3 Pixn & Fiscm RArno REG. 1 (1948) (equal quantity of time not alone sufficient to
satisfy requirements) ; KXVFT, Inc., 4 id. 835 (1948) (time offered in primary and general
elections are independent of each other); Bellingham Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 159
(1940) (cancellation and rescheduling of time alloted candidates, in absence of evidence
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candidates for the same office. Sectidn 315, however, does not obligate stations
to accept campaign speeches initially.4 Second, the licensee may not censor
speeches made under this section of the statuter'
of treatment accorded opposition candidates, suggests, but not conclusively, that equal
opportunity was denied); Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 3 PiKE & FISCHER RADIO REG,
1820 (1946) (more stringent investigation of one candidate to determine the identity
of sponsor not denial of equal opportunity). See Peterson, supra note 2, at 26-7, and second
paragraph of note 4 infra.
To aid in the enforcement of the rules, every licensee must keep and permit public
inspection of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of candidates and
the disposition of those requests. 47 CODE FED. RExs. §§ 3.190 (d) (AM), 3.290(d) (Flv,),
3.690(d) (TV) (1949). Also: "If a speech is made by a political candidate, the name
and political affiliations of such speaker shall be entered [in the station log]." 47 id.
§§ 3.181 (a) (2) (AM), 3.281 (a) (2) (FM), 3.681(a) (2) (TV) (1949). And see the
regulations relating to the announcement of sponsorship during broadcasts. 47 id.
§§3.189(AM), 3.289(FM), 3.689(TV) (1949).
4. Despite the "no obligation" clause, it is doubtful if the FCC would condone a policy
of not permitting candidates to speak. See Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 3 PI'mr
& FIscHER RADIO REG. 1820 (1946); Homer P. Rainey, 3 id. 737 (1948); Stephens
Broadcasting Co., 3 id. 1 (1948) ; KWFT, Inc., 4 id. 885 (1948)-all expressing the view,
in dicta, that such a policy would be inconsistent with the licensee's responsibility to
broadcast in the public interest. The possibility that such a policy might result in loss of
a license was raised in Peterson, supra note 2, at 21-2.
The FCC has taken the position that once the licensee agrees to accept campaign
speeches by candidates, it cannot rely on the "no obligation" clause to excuse a cancellation
of all the speeches before the first one is made. When portions of the first speech were
suspected of being libelous, such a cancellation was held to constitute censorship, Port
Huron Broadcasting Co., 4 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1, 4 (1948). But a dissenting
opinion in this case attacked this interpretation as nullifying the "no obligation" clause.
rd. at 14 (Separate Opinion of Commissioner Jones). Cf. Weiss v. Los Angeles Broad-
casting Co., 163 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1947) (§ 315 can be
applied only when one candidate has already spoken and another seeks time), critically
noted in 61 HARv. L. Rav. 552 (1948). See also 21 So. CALIF. L. REV. 292 (1948).
5. The censorship ban has been given conflicting interpretations. In Sorenson v.
Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed sub nora:. KFAB Broad-
casting Co. v. Sorenson, 290 U.S. 599 (1933), involving the same clause in the Radio Act
of 1927, the court held freedom from censorship applied to the "political and partisan
trend" only-with the licensee retaining the right to delete defamatory material. Approved :
Berry and Goodrich, Political Defamation: Radio's Dilemma, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 343
(1948); Note, 4 AIR L. REv. 80 (1933). Disapproved: Donnelly, Dcfamation by Radio:
A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. REv. 12 (1948) ; Nash, The Application Of The Law Of
Libel And Slander To Radio Broadcasting, 17 ORE. L. REV. 307 (1938). An opposite
result, denying the right to censor even defamatory material, was reached in Josephson v.
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.Supp. 2d 985 (Sup.Ct. 1942).
The strongest judicial statement of this view is in Felix. v. Westinghouse Radio Stations,
89 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950), revld on other grounds, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950).
The latter view coincides with that of the FCC. ". . . [T]he prohibition of Section
315 against censorship by licensees of political speeches by candidates for public office is
absolute, and no exception exists in the case of material which is either libelous or might
tend to involve the station in an action for damages." Port Huron Broadcasting Co,,
4 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO RG. 1, 7 (1948). However, the force of this statement has been
considerably weakened. Challenged in the courts, it was held to be just an expression of
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NOTES
Licensees have been faced by at least three major uncertainties in 315 :, its
coverage, the ex-tent of the censorship ban, and the section's effect on liability
for defamation. As to the coverage problem, legal observers, as well as the
FCC, have interpreted the section to apply only to candidates and not to their
supporters.7 Despite this, many licensees have operated on the assumption
that supporters are also included.8 They have made equal time available to
opposing supporters, parties and candidates. Also, speeches of both supporters
opinion as to what the law is and not a regulation with the effect of law. Houston Post
Co., 79 F.Supp. 199 (S.D. Te.- 1948). Later, FCC Chairman Wayne Coy was quoted
by Chairman Harness of a House committee investigating the Commission as telling the
committee that "the honest and conscientous broadcaster who uses ordinary common ! ense
in trying to prevent obscene or slanderous or libelous statements from going over the air
need not fear any capricious action." 17 U.S.LAXV. 207S (1948).
Thus lawyers have advised their licensee-clients not to carry political speeches if parts
suspected of being defamatory are nol removed. tlcarings before a Senate Siconinittec
of the Committee on Interstatc and Foreign Conmerce on S333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
103-4 (1947) (hereafter cited as 1947 Hearings) ; Donnelly, sitpra, at 31. Some licensees
have followed this advice. For example, see Communication to Y.%LE LAw JoLt :.NAL from
Willard Schroeder, WOOD-Grand Rapids, dated April 14, 1951, in Yale Law Library
(station insists on changing slanderous statements or those in bade taste) ; Bellinghaizm
Broadcasting Co., S F.C.C. 159 (1940). But NAB Counsel offer as the best "practical
advice," pre-broadcast e_.mmination of scripts and moral suasion to convince the speaker
that suspect portions of the script should be deleted. NAB GEN.nAL CouNsE.'s M MO-
RANDVIM, SPEECHFS BY Oa FoR CANDMATES FOR PUBLIc OFricE 7 (1949). Billk have
been introduced to enable licensees to censor defamatory matter, but were not adopted.
S.1520, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1939) and S.814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (19431.
Recently, the FCC announced that doubt and uncertainty in tile law would no longer
justify licensee censorship. In reaffirming its Port Huron doctrine, tile Commission de-
clared its intention to enforce the ban strictly regardless of state libel laws. WDSU
Broadcasting Corp., 20 U.S.LW. 2228 (1951).
As to when the ban on censorship takes effect, see second paragraph of note 4 stipra.
For the relationship between the interpretation of the censorship ban adopted and the
rule of liability imposed by the courts see notes 13 and 14 in! ra.
6. The problems arising under § 315 are not limited to those treated in this Nute. See
notes 2, 3 and 4 supra. Also, Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 163 F2d 313 (9th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1947), raised, and left undecided, the question of
whether an action for damages would lie in favor of a candidate against a liceniee who
violated § 315.
7. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S.814, 78th ,.
1st Sess. 60 (1943) (statement of Commissioner Fly) (hereafter cited as 10,13 Heirinqs).
Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Wayne Coy, Chairman of tile FCC,
dated May 14, 1951, in Yale Law Library. See Haley, The Law on Radio Programs,
5 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 157, 173 (1937) ; Peterson, supra note 2, at 26; Vold, Defamation
By Radio, 2 Joutx.AL oF RADio LAW 673, 698 (1932).
8. Communications to the Y,IE LA" JouRN;.%L from: Carl George, WGAR-Cleveland,
dated April 13, 1951; Willard Schroeder, WOOD-Grand Rapids, dated April 14, 1951;
Elliot M. Sanger, WQXR-New York-, April 20, 1951; Carl Mark, WTTMI-Trenton,
dated April 16, 1951; Willard L. Kline, KEPO-EI Paso, dated April 23, 1951; in Yale
Law Library. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 26.
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and candidates have gone uncensored. 9 These practices have contributed to a
fine industry record of fair treatment in past political campaigns.10 In regard
to the censorship and defamation problems, industry spokesmen, legal writers
and the FCC have urged that the ban on censorship requires immunity from
liability for the licensee." But this assumes that the ban is absolute-forbidding
deletion of even defamatory material. However, neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has authoritatively determined the limits of the ban.12 As a
result, in the few cases that have arisen, courts have split on the issue of
whether section 315 is a defense to defamation liability. In states adopting an
absolute liability rule for radio defamation, it has not been a defense.18 A
9. Communications to the YAiE LAW JOURNAL from: Leon Goldstein, WMCA-New
York, dated April 13, 1951; George Patterson, WAVE-Louisville, dated April 16, 1951;
James H. Neu, Columbia Broadcasting System Legal Department, dated May 3, 1951;
Frank P. Schreiber, WGN-Chicago, dated April 17, 1951; on file in Yale Law Library.
10. Only twice in its annual reports has the FCC mentioned receiving complaints
against licensees. In both instances, uncertainty as to the meaning of 315's provisions
apparently caused the trouble. FCC, ANNUAL REPORT 40 (1937); ANNUAL RE'ORT 56
(1940). And when one of radio's severer critics underlined the various types of dis-
crimination in the discussion of controversial issues, there was no mention of biased
treatment of candidates. Seipmann, RADIO'S SECOND CHANCE 104-15 (1947).
11. The FCC's view is that the prohibition against censorship "relieve[s] the licensee
of responsibility for any libelous matter broadcast in the course of a speech coming within
Section 315." Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 4 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REo. 1, 7 (1948).
This view has been urged consistently by the FCC in support of various bills to amend
the Act. See 1947 Hearings, supra note 5, at 552; 1943 Hcarings, supra note 7, at 64;
FCC, COMMENTS ON TITLE I OF THE SADOWSKI BILL-H.R. 6949, 81ST CONG., 1ST SESS,
6 (1950) (hereafter cited as SADOWSKI COMMENTS).
The industry view may be found in the statement of Edgar Kobak, President of
Mutual Broadcasting System, in 1947 Hearings, supra note 5, at 355; Broadcasting-Tcle-
casting, April 30, 1951, p. 48.
For the reaction of legal writers, see Donnelly, supra note 5, at 40; Note, 16 Gco.
WASH. L. REv. 573 (1948).
12. See note 5 supra and note 19 infra.
13. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismisscd sub oti.
KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorenson, 290 U.S. 599 (1933). This is the only case to
appear in a strict liability jurisdiction. Other state courts adopting a strict liability
rule for radio defamation generally have relied on the reasoning of the Sorenson Case.
Presumably, they will also follow that case in holdirig 315 no defense in cases arising
under this section. However, it is conceivable that a court may adopt a strict liability
rule and yet recognize certain defenses. Cf. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127
(1938) (strict liability adopted [though later changed by statute] but defense of privilege
upheld).
States either adopting or leaning toward strict liability include: Massachusetts,
Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d 595 (1943); Missouri,
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934); McDonald v.
R.I. Polk & Co., 346 Mo. 615, 142 S.W.2d 635 (1940); Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo, 1077,
152 S.W.2d 28 (1948); Ohio, Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers, 54 Ohio App. 40, 6
N.E.2d 29 (1934) ; Washington, Miles v. Louis Wasmer Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847
(1933) (later changed by statute, but due care test made so narrow as to be equivalent




majority of states, however, adopting the liability with fault principle, regard
315 as a good defense.' 4
For support of the strict liability rule see: Void, The Basis For Liability For Deja-
mation by Radio, 19 MIMi. L. REv. 611 (1935); Keller, Federal Control of Dcfalnation
by Radio, 12 NoraE DAME LAW. 15 (1936), 134 (1937); Nash, supra note 5, at 307:
Note, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1002 (1941). On the compatibility of a strict liability rule tor
radio defamation with immunity .for the licensee in political broadcasts, see Donnelly,
supra note 5, at 14-28, 33-40. See also, Note, 10 U. OF Prrrs. L. REV. 375 (1945).
For the law on radio defamation generally consult: Haley, supra note 7, at 171-97;
Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends In Defamation By Radio, 64 H,%R'. L. REv. 727
(1951); SocoLow, 2 THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 847-70 (1939); NAB GE:E.RAL
COUNSEL'S MfE0oRANDU-, LIABILITY OF BROADCASTER FOR DEFAMATIO N (1949).
14. Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.Supp.24
985 (Sup. Ct 1942). But the leading case on the fault principle for radio defamation
did not involve 315. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Company, 336 Pa. 182,
8 A.2d 302 (1939). When such a case did arise under the law of that jurisdiction, the
courts upheld the validity of 315 as a defense. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations,
89 F.Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rcv'd on other grounds, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950). But
the possibility remains that even a fault principle state, if it adopts the view that 315
permits the censorship of defamatory material, note 5 supra, could hold the licensee liable.
Such a view was urged by plaintiff in the Felix case. Brief for Appellant, pp. 14-7.
States that have either adopted or lean toward a fault principle for radio defamation
include: CAI. CIV. CODE ANN. § 48.5 (Deering 1949); CoLo. STAT. AiNN. C. 13B, § I
(Repl. 1949) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.04 (Supp. 1950) ; GA. CODE: AN.-N. § 105-712 (Supp.
1949); IL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 404.2 (1951) (criminal liability); IoWA CODE ANN--
§ 659.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. c. 60, § 746a (1949); 'MIcu. STAT. ANN. § 27.1405
(Supp. Aug., 1951) ; LAws OF NED. c. 316 (1949) ; New Jersey, Kelly v. Hoffman, 137
N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948); N.C. GEN. CODE ANN. § 99-5 (1950); North Dakota,
Haggard v. First National Bank of 'Mandan, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N. V.2d 5 (1942); O.
CoMP. LAws ANx. § 1-909A (Supp. 1943); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-632.1 (1950); Asu.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 998-1 (Supp. 1943) (see note 13 supra); Wyo. ColiP. ST,%T. ANN.
§ 3-8203 (Mills Supp. 1951).
For journal literature supporting the fault principle see: Bohlen, Fifty Years of
Torts, 50 HAgs. L. REv. 725 (1937) ; Farnum, Radio Defamation And The Amcrican
Law Institute, 16 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1936) ; Royce, Defamation Via Radio, 1 Ouio ST. L J.
180 (1935).
A number of states, largely those adopting a fault principle by statute, have legislated
on the particular problem of the campaign speaker. CAL. Cnv. CoDE ANN. §43.5(3)
(Deering 1949), MicH. STAT. ANN. §27.1406 (Supp. Aug., 1951); and Colorado, supra
(no liability when licensee cannot censor because of federal statute or regulation) ; Florida,
supra (due care means compliance with federal law and regulation); -MONT. R.Ev. CoQD
tit. 64, §205 (1949) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-11-9 (Supp. 1951) (no liability for
candidates' speeches in absence of malice) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 3-8204 (Mills Supp.
1951) (no liability for candidates' speeches); G.-. CODE ANN. § 105-713 tSupp. 1949),
Virginia and Nebraska, supra (no liability for speeches by or on behalf of candidates ;
Illinois, supra (no criminal liability for candidates' speeches). The due care statutes vith
special provision for campaign speeches are based on a model law proposed by the NAB.
NAB GENERAL COUNSEL'S 'MEMORANDUt, LIABILITy OF BROADrASTE FOR DEFAMATION 8
(1949). Some statutes, e.g. Washington and Montana supra, have the same general pur-
pose of protecting the broadcaster but differ materially in their provisions. Still other
states have statutes which do not fall into either of the two main categories, e.g. IND.
STAT. Ax. §§ 2-518, 2-519 (Burns Cum. Repl. 1946).
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Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations 15 illustrates how the narrow view of
315's coverage broadens defamation liability for innocent licensees, thereby
inviting discriminatory treatment of political speakers. Arising in a fault juris-
diction, this case was a by-product of the October 1949 municipal election
campaign in Philadelphia. Non-candidate William F. Meade, Chairman of
the Republican Central Campaign Committee, contracted with the defendant
radio stations for time to broadcast two campaign speeches personally. The
theme of Meade's speeches was that the Democratic Party in Philadelphia was
supported, and more or less controlled, by a communist group. Plaintiff was
named as one of the group. Consequently, he sued for libel. The district court,
assuming for purposes of the decision that Meade's statements were libelous,
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.' 6 It held that 315 applied
to supporters and candidates, and since it barred defendants from deleting
defamatory material in M2\eade's speeches, they were not at fault in broadcasting
the libelous statements. 17 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
Congress intended 315 to apply only to candidates personally and not to their
supporters. The defendants, therefore, did have a right to censor and were at
fault in failing to exercise that right. Thus, they were liable for Meade's
defamatory utterances.' The Supreme Court denied certiorari.10
The legislative history of 315 supports the appellate court's holding.20 But
the resulting distinction is unrealistic. Normally, all speeches are part of a
15. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951). Diversity of
citizenship gave the federal courts jurisdiction.
16. 89 F.Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
17. Kirkpatrick, C.J., based his decision on a strong policy argument. He reasoned
that the obvious purpose of the section is to insure full and free discussion of both sides
of issues which affect the voters' choice. That purpose would be frustrated unless a
candidate's "use" of facilities is construed to include speeches by authorized supporters.
Id. at 742.
18. As to the policy argument raised by the district court, note 17 supra, the Court
of Appeals conceded that there were strong reasons for the lower court's construction,
but concluded that the public policy question must be left to Congress. 186 F.2d 1, 3, 6
(3d Cir. 1950).
19. 341 U.S. 909 (1951). For criticism of the Court's refusal to review the case, see
Rodell, Our Not So Supreme Court, Look, July 31, 1951, p. 60.
20. See the circuit court opinion for a detailed and accurate review of the legislative
history of 315 and its verbatim predecessor, § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927. In the Senate
debate on the compromise measure that was to become § 18, Senator Howell, a member
of the committee handling the bill, observed, without dispute, that "under the provislots
of . . . [18] if a candidate is allowed to use a station, other candidates for the same
office must be allowed the same privilege, however, if a representative of a candidate is
allowed to use a station, there is no provision that the representatives of other candidates
must likewise be allowed to broadcast." 68 Cong. Rec. 4152 (1927). As the court points
out, an amendment expressly covering supporters was passed by Congress in 1932 but
killed by a presidential pocket veto. A similar amendment was passed by the Senate when
the Communications Act was being considered, but was stricken out by House-Senate




comprehensive campaign plan.2 ' And supporters of candidates may be as
effective campaigners as candidates themselves.2 2 The court s distinction suc-
ceeds only in giving partisan licensees a tool for frustrating the broader aim of
Congress-impartial treatment during campaigns.
Without the statutory standard of equal opportunity for suppo irters, the
licensee could deny equal access to his station to the supporters of disfavored
candidates.2 3 They could be barred completely or be given less favorable
broadcasting or telecasting hours. And without the censorship ban, the licensee
could reduce the effectiveness of disfavored speakers by deleting the hard-
hitting portions of their speeches under the guise of censoring defamatory
material. Moreover, unless the ban is absolute, even candidates admittedly
within 315's coverage could be hindered the same way. -4
The FCC has only one alternative standard by which to judge treatment
accorded non-candidates: "fairness." 25 This standard was promulgated by the
FCC for use in policing discussion of other controversial issues. Under it,
controversial issues may be freely discussed on the air,2 and the licensee may
express his views on all issues ;27 but the overall treatment of any issue must
represent all viewpoints fairly. "Fairness," however, has not been an effective
barrier to licensee discrimination in discussion of controversial issues-for
several reasons. First, the standard is so vague that it is difficult to prove a
clear-cut violation.2 8  Second, the FCC has been reluctant to punish violators.
21. See Smith, Campaign Communications Media, 259 ATtAs 90 (194S); AValsh,
How to Use a Speakers Bureast in a Political Campaign. 3 PUBLIc Opinio: QuAr, x,
92 (1939).
22. The FCC used this argument to urge the extension of 315's coverage. S.,aowsrit
Co3nINTs5, op. cit. supra note 11, at 6.
23. Recognition of this danger was the crux of the district court's argument in
holding supporters within the scope of 315. 89 F.Supp. 740, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1950). It is
shared by the FCC. SADowsxl Coim~rrs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 6. This fear is also
voiced in Notes, 21 So. CAnin. L. Ray. 292 (1948) ; 24 TEYP. L. Q. 236 (1950). See also
Kaltenborn, Is Radio Politically Impartial?, 62 American Mercury 665, 669 (1946).
24. The FCC's position is that the right to censor is a power which may be readily
influenced by the licensee's own sympathies and allegiances. Such a power would give
"to radio stations a positive weapon of discrimination between contesting candidates."
Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 4 PxKE & FiscHFR RADIO REG: 1, 5 (1948).. The
FCC is not alone in this fear. See Donnelly, supra note 5, at 32; Nash, supra 5, at
307, 310-1; Note, 61 HAav. L. Ray. 552 (1948).
25. "Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and equal
opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public issues. Indeed, as one
licensed to operate in a public domain the licensee has assumed the obligation of prcsent-
ing all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively and without bias." May-
flower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941). See also Editorializing by Broad-
cast Licensees, 1 P=ca & FisCHR Rkmo REG. 91: 201-2 (1949).
26. Id. at 91:205.
27. Id. at 91:207.
28. "It should be recognized that there can be no one all embracing formula which
licensees can hope to apply to insure the fair and balanced presentation of all public
issues.... The licensee will in each instance be called upon to exercise his best judg-
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The only sanctions available-license revocation or refusal to renew-are so
severe, constituting a business death sentence, that they have been used only
once by the FCC in a case of objectionable program content.20 Moreover,
whenever the FCC has tried to use program content as a basis for license
renewal, the industry and its congressional advocates protested vigorously.' 2
This has furthered the FCC's reluctance to enforce the standard rigidly.
Realistically then, the licensee is capable of partisanship by "weighting" the
expression of opinion in favor of a chosen candidate or party without fear of
punishment.31 Political partisanship in other media, particularly the press, is
ment and good sense . . ." Id. at 91:206. "The question is necessarily one of the reason-
ableness of the station's actions, not whether any absolute standard of fairness has been
achieved." Id. at 91:209. Meanwhile, Commissioner Jones said, in his dissent, "outsile the
context of particular circumstances, I do not believe that an a priori standard so broad
and vague has significant meaning." Id. at 91:218.
29. See id. at 91:224 (Dissenting Views of Commissioner Hennock). See also Coan'
ment, 60 YALE L.J. 78, 106-9 (1950) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 759 (1949).
The FCC refused to renew one license because the entire afternoon period of this
daytime-only station was devoted to sports programs, chiefly horse-race results. Port
Frere Broadcasting Co., 5 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1137 (1950). The possibility of
license denial for a more controversial reason arose when the FCC considered the ap-
plication for license renewal and transfer of three stations under the control of G, A.
Richards. He was accused, inter alia, of ordering the slanting, distortion and suppresgiou
of news on his stations. This much publicized case was first brought to tile Comllis-
sion's attention early in 1948. Notice of Richard's death on May 28, 1951 ended proceed.
ings. KMPC, The Station Of The Stars, Inc., 7 id. 313 (1951). However, tile FCC has
frequently refused to renew licenses for reasons other than program content, e.. tliS-
representation, financial or technical inadequacy.
The Federal Radio Commission, predecessor of the FCC, successfully refused to
renew two licenses because of objectionable program content. KFKB Broadcasting
Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670 (C.C.A. D.C. 1931) (unethical
medical advice to aid licensee's pharmaceutical business) ; Trinity Methodist Church,
South, v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (C.C.A. D.C. 1932), cert. denied, 288
U. S. 599 (1933) (recurring broadcasts of false and. defamatory matter).
30. Popularly referred to as the "Blue Book", a 1946 report was the Comissionl's
most ambitious attempt to erect positive standards for program content. FCC, Putilic
SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946). The protests froim Congress
and the industry were immediate and indignant. See WHITE, THE AMEiucAN RAVIO
197-8 (1947). "The Blue Book . . . is considered by the industry as a (lead letter. Its
requirements of the licensee have been repeatedly overlooked in Commission practice
with reference to license renewal." SIEPMANN, RADIO, TELEvIsIoN, AND SOCIETY 336
(1950). See Comment, supra note 29, at 105-6 n. 134 (references to repeated coingres-
sional investigations and torrents of industry criticism).
31. A recognized form of licensee partisanship is through news analysts and coin-
mentators whose views parallel or mirror those of their employers, The FCC has
recognized this and presumably contemplates a balancing of the views expressed by these
speakers too. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 1 PxIKE & FISCHER RADlO Rta,
91:206-8 (1949). But see the dissenting views of Commissioner Jones, at 91:221-4. For
a good analysis of the problem and documentation of the record of licensee discrimilta-




already well established.32 But if all candidates are to have an equal oppur-
tunity to present their views to the electorate, they must be treated with a
modicum of impartiality by the mass communications media. This is particu-
larly necessary since modern campaigning relies so heavily on these media. 3-
Radio has proven itself a most effective campaign device ;34 and television is
expected to wield even greater influence.3 By requiring them to treat candi-
dates and their supporters impartially, a counterbalance to partisanship and
bias in other areas of mass communications can be maintained.
A first step has already been taken to plug the loophole in section 315. A
bill to extend its coverage to supporters has been introduced in the Senate.O
32. Surveyists Lazarsfeld and Kendall found that, at best, a bare majority of those
polled thought the press fair in giving both sides of public questions (1945--395;
1947-55%) ; a substantial majority, however, thought radio stations fair (1945--31,o;
1947-79%). They explain the difference in attitude this way: "After all, newspapers
are entitled, by tradition, to editorial opinion and they do not claim to present boith sides
of every argument." LAZARSFELD & KENDALL, R.A io Lism TE:zG I,. A7,1uC% 53,8, at 58
(1948). For attitudes toward magazines see, LAZARSFELD & Fxu.t, TrE Pwrim Loon
AT RADIO 78-9 (1946).
The tendency of a paper's news coverage to reflect its editorial bias, as %yell as the
disproportionate support given Republican candidates in past campaigns was cited in
KEY, PoLITIcs PARTIES AND PREssuRE GROUPS 592-3 (1942). See also Smith, supra
note 21, at 93.
For a statistical examination of the alarming decline in the number of newspapers and
the increasing concentration of ownership and control of all the communications media,
see ERNxST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946). Also consult SIEI'MANN, RADIO'S SEwoD
CHANCE 129-30 (1947).
33. Lack of money, apparently, is the major factor limiting the politician's use of the
communications media during campaigns. Smith. supra note 21, at 90. For the substan-
tial sums spent by the major parties in 1944 and 1948, see Newsweek, Nov. 1, 1948, p. 52.
34. Radio has generally been considered the most effective campaign medium b.the
politicos. FA.E=, BEHIxD THE BALLoTs 318-20 (1938); Smith, supra note 21, at 93-4,
96-7.
35. Television was not relied on very much in the 1948 campaign. Expense, limited
audience, and unpredictable results were the suggested causes. Newsweek, Nov. 1, 1948,
p. 52. But now, only expense remains an obstacle to its widespread use. U.S. News &
World Report, June 23, 1950, p. 14. For a description of its effective use in the 1950 New
York gubernatorial race see 67 CHRISTILAN CENTURY 13S1 (1950). It has been suggested
that during the peak listening hours, television will eventually displace radio. Watn.iP,
RADIO AND TFLavlsioN LAw 670 (1948).
36. S.1379, 82nd Cong., 1st .Sess. (1951). The bill extends coverage to any person
authorized by a candidate to speak for and on his behalf. It was introduced by Senator
Ed Johnson of Colorado, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. For the origin of the bill see Berlyn, Libel Dilemma, Broadcasting-Telecasting,
April 30, 1951, p. 23. The bill was referred to Johnson's committee.
The advantage of the bill, even with the extensions suggested in this Note, over
similar bills in the past, is its modesty. Previously, the same proposals were linked to
other more ambitious amendments-like extending the principle of "equal pp,.rtunity"
to all controversal issues-or have been only a small part uf bills cnvi. aging major
changes in radio regulation. E.g. S.1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; IIU.R694% Se-
tion 202, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950). Since it stands alone, the suggested bill can bL
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The FCC has consistently advocated such legislation. And indications are
that much of the industry will favor this bill.37 But if Congress acts to extend
315's coverage, it should use that same opportunity to resolve the defamation
problem. By granting licensees a blanket immunity for defamation in section
315 speeches, Congress could assure licensees uniform treatment in libel suits.
As a corollary, the uncertainty over the scope of the censorship ban should be
"removed by explicitly forbidding all censorship, including the deletion of
defamatory material.
The most familiar objection to the proposed immunity IS is the possibility
that a defamed person may have no remedy because the speaker is impecuni-.
ous.3 9 This highlights a basic conflict in policy objectives-protection of the
innocent versus encouragement of free political thought and expression. But
the necessity of the latter in a democratic society is already reflected in our
libel laws by the defense of privilege to make fair comment on matters of public
interest.40 This doctrine, coupled with public disapproval of libel suits brought
by politicians, makes it so difficult to maintain an action against a candidate, or a
licensee standing in his shoes, that few suits are brought.41 Thus, the policy
judged on its merits. Opposition to either unrelated or more extreme amendments will
not obstruct passage.
37. 1943 Hearings, supra note 7, at 60; 1947 Hearings, supra note 5, at 52; SAOWSKI
CoMMENTs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 6. The industry trade magazine has supported the bill.
Public Service Perils, Broadcasting-Telecasting, April 30, 1951, p. 18. In fact, the Johnson
bill was suggested by a licensee. Berlyn, supra note 36, at 40. Also, licensees wishing
to avail themselves of state laws that exempt them from liability when they are not al-
lowed to censor, note 14 supra, will probably support the bill-particularly those who are
not protected by libel insurance or indemnity agreements. These devices are now used
by many licensees. Communications to YALE LAW JOURNAL cited in notes 8 and 9 supra.
38. In addition to the objection noted in the text, the argument has often been raised
that a federal grant of immunity would be unconstitutional. This is based on the theory
that the citizen could not be deprived of a remedy at law in state courts by the federal
government without providing a federal substitute. This objection, however, has been
effectively rebutted by the argument that the federal government has occupied the field
legitimately and, in the interests of national uniformity, may define the rights, privileges,
and liabilities of those regulated. See 1943 Hearings, supra note 7, at 950-1 (FCC Meno-
randum) ; Donnelly, supra note 5, at 33-7.
39. See the exchange of views of Commissioner Fly and Senators McFarland and
Wheeler in 1943 Hearings, supra note 7 at 64-5.
40, Each person has a qualified privilege to publish matters affecting the interest of
the general public. A narrow majority of states limits the privilege to comment or
opinion but not to false statements of fact. However, there is a strong minority view that
false statements of facts concerning candidates are privileged if made for the public in.
terest with an honest belief in their truth. The modern trend is toward this broader inter-
pretation of the privilege, but limited even here, to facts which bear upon official conduct
or fitness for office. PRossR, TORTS 839-44 (1941) ; HARPER, TORTS 542-6 (1933).
41. See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers And Candidates, 49 COL. L. RLv. 875
(1949). The paucity of suits should not be taken to mean that licensee immunity is really
not important or necessary. The possibility of suit, however slight, can be used to ex-
cuse licensee censorship of political scripts. See note 5 supra. Granting the licensee im-
munity is necessary to justify and effectuate an absolute censorship ban. But tile absence
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